Светлый фон
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Rapoport, A., and A. M. Chammah. 1965. Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

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Raub, W., and T. Voss. 1986. Conditions for Cooperation in Problematic Social Situations. In Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of Anatol Rapoport, eds. A. Diekmann and P. Mitter, pp. 85— 103. Vienna: Physica-Verlag Heidelberg.

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Rhodes, R. E., and S. J. Thompson. 1975. Adaptive Strategies in Alpine Environments: Beyond Ecological Particularism. American Ethnologist 2:535 — 51.

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Riker, W. H. 1980. Implications for the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. American Political Science Review 74:432 — 47.

Riker, W. H.

Riker, W. H., and P. C. Ordeshook. 1973. An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. New York: Prentice-Hall.

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Roberts, M. 1980. Traditional Customs and Irrigation Development in Sri Lanka. In Irrigation and Agricultural Development in Asia, ed. E. W. Coward, Jr., pp. 186–202. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press.

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Rolph, E. S. 1982. Government Allocation of Property Rights: Why and How. Technical report, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California.

Rolph, E. S.

Rolph, E. S. 1983. Government Allocation of Property Rights: Who Gets What? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 3:45–61.

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Rose-Ackerman, S. 1977. Market Models for Water Pollution Control: Their Strengths and Weaknesses. Public Policy 25:383–406.