What were the main points of Leontiev's theory? What points has he added to the three propositions of AT that refer to Rubinstein?

1. Psyche is the result of the internalization of processes of outward activity. It is a derivative of the outward process, the outward process internalized.

2. The structure of psychic processes is isomorphic to the structure of outward activity from which psyche is a derivative.

The latter proposition he believed to be the essential one and the key to psychological analysis.

These propositions can be considered rather as elaborations of Rubinstein's proposition B, concerning how psyche is shaped, but these elaborations are more narrow and one-sided interpretations of Rubinstein's general formula. Rubinstein considers the interaction between the individual with the environment as a substrate generating psyche. But this does not mean that material interaction is the only and even the main factor, determining psychic development. His stressing of internal subjective mediation of external stimuli should not be underestimated. The inner, the subjective (and first of all motivational phenomena), for Rubinstein determined not only the objective process of interaction with the environment (external), but also the subjective experiencing of this interaction (internal), thus, psyche formation can never be viewed as a straightforward one-sided process of internalization of the outward processes.

Leontiev's theory might be considered to be a simplified approach: it is very straightforward, too straightforward, perhaps. When foreign colleagues blame RAT for it: "(1) relies on unidirectional instead of a theoretically more plausible dialectical view of culture-individual relationships; (2) focuses in analyses on activities without taking into account the individual involved in the activity at the same time" (Toomela, 2000, p.298), – it is all true as far as Leontiev's theory is concerned. Leontiev consistently refused "to look inside the individual". He is emphasizing, for example, the difference between needs and motives, he limits his analysis to motives, to how they structure activity, and turns away from the problem of the needs (Leontiev, 1978).

He considered that needs are the attributes, the inalienable properties of the individual, denoting something that is really necessary for survival. For example, the need for food can be described in terms of proteins, fats, carbohydrates and vitamins, etc., necessary to ensure homeostasis. Needs can be either conscious or unconscious. A motive Leontiev defined as something which an individual fancies that he needs. For example, a motive relevant to the necessity for food can be a pastry or a beefsteak. To engender activity a need has to be "embodied" in a motive and the latter serves as a goal for the active interaction with the environment: a motive determines whether we cook pastries or beefsteaks. A need not "embodied" in a motive cannot engender activity, and produces only a stirring state of excitation, like hunger in a situation when no food is available.