Meanwhile, despite the popularity of the idea of war as a guarantee of English prosperity, it could never be reflected in official documents proceeding from the royal court. At each stage of every conflict the English crown invariably emphasised that war was the only means of achieving an honourable peace. In the framework of medieval mentality, for which the analysis of war into religious categories was typical, violation of divine law and justice was treated as a sinful act to be punished, even through armed conflict if necessary. Peace, just like war, directly depended on justice: abuse of the law required retribution. War was a way of establishing law and order and restoring lost peace, the foundation of peace rather than the alternative to it. Without restoration of violated justice, peace lost its value and was condemned in the same way as an unjust mercenary war. The theme of condemnation of any truce with enemies without the absolute restoration of justice was a major motive in English political and historical literature. Thus, English adherents of the conception of the just war resolutely condemned not only "the shameful peace" with Scotland concluded in 1328, or the truce with France in 1347, but also the treaty of Bretigny signed in 1360, which is traditionally viewed by modem scholars as a great success of English diplomacy. The fact that this treaty was unpopular in France is beyond question. However the sources tell us that many English people were also dissatisfied with this venture, interpreting it as a shameful renunciation of the ultimate goal — the return of the crown to the rightful king.

From the point of view of the majority of English authors the only worthy peace with France was concluded at Troyes in 1420: by its terms Henry V was proclaimed the successor and the regent of the French crown. It is noteworthy that after the ratification of this treaty, the English parliament practically ceased to finance military campaigns in France, assuming that the English had already discharged their vassal duty to the sovereign, and leaving the costs of suppressing "rebellions" entirely to the French.

Against the background of a stable official ideology, which was reflected in the chroniclers' conceptions of history, one might do well to ask whether the wars of the 14th and the 15th centuries, especially the Hundred Years' War, introduced something exceptionally new to the English national consciousness, whether there is a reason to believe that they affected English national identity differently than, say, earlier wars with France or Scotland. In my opinion, the main difference between the wars of the Late Middle Ages and the previous epoch consists in the appearance of the notion of a certain state interest, to which all members of the society (including the sovereign) were subservient. Thus, the Hundred Years' war, which began and was represented as a typically feudal dynastic conflict and was evidently aimed to restore the legitimate authority of the Plantagenets and their descendants on the French throne, at some point became every Englishman's business. In this context the case of Richard II is revealing, since his attempts to make peace with France were treated as treason. His refusal to continue the struggle for the French crown resulted in his losing the English throne. Henry of Lancaster is portrayed in historical works as the Lord's instrument for punishment of the traitor king who cruelly and unjustly tyrannised his subjects and disdained the divine law which all kings of England must protect. The king's aspiration to follow his own desires or convictions (including Christian peace) in the determination of the foreign policy appeared to his subjects as the first step on the path from true sovereign to tyrant. The beginning of this metamorphosis lay not in Richard's innate disposition towards vice, but in fact in the attitude, traditional for a feudal epoch, to the war with France as his own affair. From the English authors' point of view, Richard II was not merely a sinner and a bad ruler but also the enemy of his own people. The history of Richard's dethronement perfectly testifies that already in the 14th century prolonged military conflicts, in particular the wars in France and Scotland, were starting to be interpreted as pertaining to the state and national interest. Not that every war was so interpreted: for example, John Gaunt's Castilian campaign was laid out as a war for the purpose of protecting the rights of the true claimant to the throne, whilst remaining his personal business. The Duke of Lancaster had not only the full authority to wage this war, but also was permitted to finish it on any terms acceptable to him. On the whole the appearance of the notion of a certain state interest in foreign policy may be considered the main change introduced into English national identity by the wars of the 14th — 15th centuries.