Lindley, D. V. (2014). Understanding Uncertainty. Rev. ed. John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, NJ.

Lord, F. M. (1967). A paradox in the interpretation of group comparisons. Psychological Bulletin 68: 304–305.

Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA.

Pearl, J. (2009). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.

Pearl, J. (2013). The curse of free-will and paradox of inevitable regret. Journal of Causal Inference 1: 255–257.

Pearl, J. (2014). Understanding Simpson’s paradox. American Statistician 88: 8–13.

Pearl, J. (2016a). Lord’s paradox revisited — (Oh Lord! Kumbaya!). Journal of Causal Inference 4. doi:10.1515/jci-2016-0021.

Pearl, J. (2016b). The sure-thing principle. Journal of Causal Inference 4: 81–86.

Savage, L. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY.

Savage, S. (2009). The Flaw of Averages: Why We Underestimate Risk in the Face of Uncertainty. John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, NJ.

Senn, S. (2006). Change from baseline and analysis of covariance revisited. Statistics in Medicine 25: 4334–4344.

Simon, H. (1954). Spurious correlation: A causal interpretation. Journal of the American Statistical Association 49: 467–479.

Tierney, J. (July 21, 1991). Behind Monty Hall’s doors: Puzzle, debate and answer? New York Times.

Wainer, H. (1991). Adjusting for differential base rates: Lord’s paradox again. Psychological Bulletin 109: 147–151.

Глава 7. За пределами поправок: покорение горы интервенции

Глава 7. За пределами поправок: покорение горы интервенции

Annotated Bibliography

Extensions of the back-door and front-door adjustments were first reported in Tian and Pearl (2002) based on Tian’s c-component factorization. These were followed by Shpitser’s algorithmization of the do-calculus (Shpitser and Pearl, 2006a) and then the completeness results of Shpitser and Pearl (2006b) and Huang and Valtorta (2006).